Abstract -A model for computing trust in wireless ad-hoc networks has been proposed. The model is based on the societal approach towards building a trusted community, where trust is built up slowly, but decreases to zero on a single detectable misbehavior. Successive trust build-ups depend on past behavior. Wireless channel loss probability has also been considered in the model. Extensive simulation has been conducted to evaluate the model under different conditions. A system level approach for incorporating the model in a real-life ad-hoc network testbed has also been discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modeling and computing trusts in ad-hoc networks has always been a challenging problem. It is very difficult to form a true and honest opinion about the trustworthiness of the nodes in such applications where the network is formed with near-strangers relying on one another for normal network operation without any prior knowledge of trustworthiness; these near-strangers can be engaged in malicious activities in different ways. This intricacy in trust computation, together with frequent topology change among nodes, quite often causes the whole network to get compromised or disrupted. Different malicious activities of the nodes can very well be misinterpreted as the regular erratic behavior of the wireless networks in general and ad-hoc networks in particular, thus making trust computation even more difficult.
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART
Modeling and computing trust for a distributed environment has been actively researched for quite a long time. Most of these distributed trust models combine direct and recommended trusts to come up with trust computations. A similar approach has been taken by the authors in [1] . They have suggested a recommendation protocol to formalize the propagation of trust information by issuing recommendation request and recommendation messages.
However, the proposed model lacks any mathematical basis to calculate the trust values. The authors have not discussed how the trust values are computed and updated. In addition, the suitability of the model can be questioned when extended to an ad-hoc network.
A policy based approach has been proposed in [2] , based on a simple language to specify trust actions and relationships. The authors proposed a trust management system called PolicyMaker which binds Public Keys to the predicates defining actions for which they are used. PolicyMaker accepts as input a set of policy statements, a collection of credentials and a description of a proposed trusted action. It then evaluates the proposed actions by interpreting the policy statements and credentials.
Watchdog mechanism [3] , based on promiscuous mode operation of the ad-hoc nodes, has been the fundamental assumption in any trust computational model. In [4] the authors have proposed a trust evaluation-based secure routing solution. The trust evaluation is done based on a trust matrix stored at each ad-hoc node. The matrix consists of several parameters on which the final trust evaluation is computed. However, the mechanism for collecting the required parameters was not discussed by the authors. They also did not discuss the means of measuring communication success or failure pertaining to the parameter experience statistics. In [5] a similar concept has been proposed. The authors have defined different trust categories based on the effectiveness of the protocol functionalities.
Trust model based on subjective logic has been proposed in [8] . The concept of subjective logic was first proposed by Josang [9] . Subjective logic is "a logic which operates on subjective beliefs about the world, and uses the term opinion to denote the representation of a subjective belief" [9] . An opinion towards another entity x is represented by three states:
and uncertainty [u(x) ], with the following equality:
( ) + ( ) + ( ) = 1 (1) The concept of subjective logic has been extended to propose a trusted routing solution in [8] . The opinion of a node about another node is represented in a 3-dimensional matrix representing trust, distrust and uncertain opinions. The opinions are updated by a positive or a negative feedback from the node in question. The proposed model, however, fails to protect the network from an internal attack, where a malicious node either refuses to forward the packets and duly authenticates itself to the source, or it cooperates with the source node and acts as a black hole.
In some of the earlier works on trust computation, incentive mechanisms have been proposed to prevent selfish behavior among the nodes. These mechanisms can be either reputationbased incentive mechanisms [10, 11] , or price-based incentive mechanism [12] . In both mechanisms, nodes are given incentives to suppress their malicious intention in favor of the network. But nodes with malicious intentions always try to find ways to bypass these incentive mechanisms. In our previous work we proposed a framework for modeling and computing trusts that take into account different malicious behavior of the nodes. Interested reader may refer to [13] .
Recently there has been an effort to represent trust and confidence on a node by using Bayesian approach. Several statistical distributions have been considered to represent the belief or trust on a node, like Gaussian, Poisson, binomial, and beta. Out of all these, beta distribution has been used by some researchers as it is characterized by two parameters, which in this case, are the number of successful interaction and the number of failed interaction [6, 7] . A standard Bayesian approach has been adopted by many where trust is represented as:
Where, θ = p(belief) is assumed to follow beta distribution and is characterized by
Where, s and f denote the number of successful and failed interactions respectively.
III. PROPOSED TRUST MODEL
One fundamental assumption underlying the above solutions has been frequently questioned by experts. Since all proposed trust models rely on watchdog mechanism, they all assume the existence of symmetrical and bidirectional wireless channels. In practice, given the well-established fact that wireless channels are unstable, lossy, asymmetric, and more prone to interference and background noise, this assumption is far from reality. We carried out a series of simple experiments on a real-life ad-hoc network testbed that has proved beyond doubt the unrealistic nature of the assumption. Interested reader may refer to [16] for more details.
In this paper we have proposed a trust model that takes into account the probability of channel loss in a wireless medium. Our model is based on the social perspective of trusted community where it takes time for an individual to build up trust, while one single detectable misbehavior can bring it down. Successive trust build-ups depend on past experience, and several parameters should be taken into consideration. Although probabilistic distributions can be used to represent trust build-up and decay, it is always a concern how to interpret and use the trust values in making communication decisions. The following are the characteristics of the model:
 Slow trust build-up  Fast decay  Successive build-ups depend on past experience about the node behavior Before presenting the model, let us take some time to revisit what is meant by trust. Trust has been defined as a belief level on another entity for performing a specific action. However, when applied in the context of ad-hoc networks, trust can be perceived as a belief level on another entity for performing all actions. So, the trust notation that we are going to use is {subject: object}. The most fundamental issue when creating a trust computational model is how to incorporate the belief level in making communication decisions. More fundamentally, if an entity has belief levels of 0.8 and 0.7 on its two neighboring entities, can it be concluded that the entity with belief level of 0.8 can be more trusted? Furthermore, in the context of using probabilistic distributions to model trust, how will an entity interpret same trust values, one on the leading side and the other on the trailing side of the graph?
The basic principle behind the trust formulation depends on the watchdog mechanism proposed by Marti et al. in [8] . Each node, after forwarding a packet to its next hop neighbor, keeps a watch to find out whether the later is forwarding the packet. Each successful observation on the part of the neighbor's behavior is denoted by s, and each failed observation when the neighbor fails to forward the packet is denoted by f. Each failed observation can be the result of malicious behavior or because of the loss of the packet due to channel loss. Trust is assumed to be a continuous value between 0 and 1.
The trust model is shown below: 
(1 ) secutive failures, or 100 2 100
failures out of 100.
where, n = total number of observations T i = Trust at the i th observation, i=1, 2…, n. s n = number of successful interactions till the n th observation. f n = number of failed interactions = n-s n d n = number of times in the past trust decreased to zero till the n th observation x i = the i th observation i 0 = the position where T n drops to 0 p = probability of channel loss
IV. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
There are three options for trust initialization when a node joins the network: a trust-your-neighbor approach where all nodes are initially trusted; a paranoid approach where no node is trusted in the beginning; and a neutral approach. We selected the third approach, and started from an initial trust of 0.5.
Each observation x i is either 1 or 0. It is a mixture of two distributions; one is Bernoulli with success probability p and the other is a degenerated distribution at 0, that is
. In other words, with probability (1-p a ), x i is a Bernoulli realization with success probability p, and with probability p a , x i is 0, where p is the probability of channel loss and p a is the probability of attack. We used two sets of random numbers set.seed (128) and set.seed (256) in statistical software R to simulate 1000 independent observations x i , i = 1, 2, …, 1000. The two conditions that make trust drop to zero are based on the empirical rules. Let us suppose that the failure is only caused by channel loss assuming channel loss is (100*p)%. First, the probability of observing (100p-1) The key idea in T n is that if T n < 0.5, it grows like an exponential function, and if T n  0.5 it grows like a logistic function. When trust is greater than 0.5, we use the weighted average of the logistic function and the average of the previous trust. The weight is the proportion of successes in the n observations. The simulation results show that if trust becomes 0, it either stays at 0 or grows slowly until enough successful interactions are observed. Even if trust is close to 1, if there are suspected attacks, instead of dropping slowly, trust drops to 0 immediately. If there is no attack, most of the time trust stays very high, and in the face of continuous attacks, will remain at 0. We considered four cases: 3% channel loss without malicious behavior; 3% channel loss with 5% chance of malicious behavior; 5% channel loss without malicious behavior; and 5% channel loss with 5% chance of malicious behavior. Figs. 1 and 2 show the trust variation assuming 3% channel loss and without malicious behavior under two different random seeds. The drops are due to packet loss satisfying the drop conditions that we discussed earlier. Figs. 3 and 4 show the corresponding trust variations under similar conditions between 200 and 300 observations and 600 and 650 observations respectively. It can be seen that trust grows exponentially from 0 when it is less than 0.5, and it increases slowly when it is close to 1. The trust drops to zero when the drop conditions are satisfied. Figs. 5 and 6 shows that trust variation under 3% channel loss and 5% chance of malicious behavior under two different random seeds. It can be seen that under such condition the trust of a node remains zero most of the times going up occasionally after large number of successful interactions. Figs. 7 and 8 show trust variation under 5% channel loss and without malicious behavior under two different random seeds. Trust grows exponentially from 0, then increases slowly, and occasionally drops to zero under packet drops due to channel loss, and going up subsequently. Figs. 9 and 10 show the increase under similar conditions. Figs. 11 and 12 show trust variation under 5% channel loss and 5% chance of malicious behavior under two different random seeds. It can be seen that under such situation trust of a node remains at zero most of the times.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a trust model for wireless ad-hoc networks in this paper. A societal approach has been taken where trust is built up slowly, but decreases to zero on a single detectable misbehavior. Wireless channel loss probability has been taken into the model. Currently we are working towards a system-level implementation of the model on a wireless adhoc network testbed that we have created on our campus, as has been discussed earlier. 
